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CASENOTES
Government Contracts-ILLEGALCONTRACTS-JURISDICTION
OF
COURTOF CLAIMSTO GRANTA QUANTUM
MERUITRECOVERY-Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552
(Ct. Cl. 1978).
In May of 1963 the Yosemite Park and Curry Co. (YPC)
entered into a concession contract with the National Park Service. YPC agreed to provide services, including public transportation, to the visitors of Yosemite Park for a reasonable charge. This
agreement was modified in 1971 to require YPC to provide the
sole means of transportation in Yosemite Park. In the new contract the National Park Service agreed to reimburse YPC's costs,
including federal income taxes, and pay a profit calculated a t
twelve and one-half percent of YPC's average gross investment in
the transportation equipment. l
After YPC performed the modified contract for four years, a
Department of Interior certifying officer informed YPC that the
contract terms providing for reimbursement of federal income
taxes and allowing more than ten percent profit on a cost-plus
contract violated federal procurement law.2 The transportation
contract was therefore illegal and invalid, and no payment could
be allowed.
YPC brought suit in the Court of Claims seeking the contract
price for the transportation services provided. Both parties moved
for summary judgment. The United States argued that there
could be no recovery on a contract that violated federal procurement law.3 In an opinion written by Judge Kunzig, the Court of
Claims agreed with the government that the contract was illegal
and invalid, but allowed a recovery in quantum meruit not to
exceed YPC's cost plus ten percent.'

A. Sovereign Immunity in Federal Procurement
The unusual holding in this case must be read in light of the
general proposition, inherited from the common law of England,
1. Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. C1. 1978).
2. Id. at 554-55. The statute and regulation violated are 41 U.S.C. 9 254(b) (1976)
and 41 C.F.R. 4 l-l5.205-4l(a)(1) (1978).
3. 582 F.2d at 555-56.
4. Id. at 561.
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that the government cannot be sued without its ~ o n s e n tIn
. ~spite
of the maxim that when the government enters the market place
it becomes subject to the same laws that govern private parties,"
contract rights can only be enforced against the government when
it has waived its immunity from suit.' The authority to waive
federal sovereign immunity is vested solely in Congress."
Congress has lessened the impact of federal sovereign immunity in various ways. Originally, claims against the United
States were brought before Congress for a hearing on the merits.
If relief was appropriate Congress would pass a private bill providing a recovery. When Congress could no longer effectively deal
with the number of suits,9 it passed statutes waiving the government's immunity from broad classes of claims. The Tucker Act,
passed in 1887, gave the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear
contract actions against the United States.lo Although the language of the Tucker Act is broad, it actually delegates only limited jurisdiction.ll Any suit which cannot be brought within the
specific jurisdictional limits of the Tucker Act cannot be heard
by the Court of Claims.
Another device that mitigates the effects of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is the power granted by Congress to the
Comptroller General to settle accounts.12As head of the General
Accounting Office, the Comptroller General has responsibility to
supervise the spending of public funds. To facilitate the execution
5. For a concise discussion of sovereign immunity in the government contracts area,
see Editorial Note, Government Subcontractors' Remedies in Rem, 30 GEO.WASH.
L. REV.
994 (1962).
6. See generally Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579-82 (1934).
7. The United States may not impair or abrogate its contractual obligations. Consent
to sue the United States, however, is not part of any contractual obligation with the
United States; consequently, a contractor may have a legal right to recovery but no
remedy. Id. a t 580-81.
8. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S.
495 (1940).
9. For example, the private bills passed in 1883 (largely contract claims) cover 60
pages of the Statutes a t Large. 22 Stat. 750-810 (1883).
10. Tucker Act, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505 (current version codified a t 28 U.S.C. 4 §
l346(a), 1491 (1976)).
11. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra.
12. 31 U.S.C. $5 71, 74 (1976). An individual or firm may file with the Comptroller
General a claim arising out of a contract award or breach of contract. The General Accounting Office has no established procedure for filing such claims; both parties simply
submit their versions of the case. Any disputed factual issues are resolved in favor of the
government. See, e.g., 44 Comp. Gen. 353 (1964); 36 Comp. Gen. 507 (1957). The Comptroller General resolves disputed factual issues in favor of the government because only
the government is bound by his decisions. The contractor may still file suit under the
Tucker Act after being denied relief by the Comptroller General.
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of that responsibility, the Comptroller General has the authority
to settle "[all1 claims and demands . . . in which the Government of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or creditor."13 Congress has further provided that decisions made by the
Comptroller General on the settlement of public accounts are
"final and conclusive upon the Executive Branch of the Government."14 Under limited circumstances, aggrieved contractors
have had their claims settled by the Comptroller General without
his ever reaching the question of the government's immunity from
suit. Appeal to the Comptroller General, however, is useful only
in those situations where the liability of the government can be
determined from the record without examination of witnesses or
consideration of conflicting evidence.15
Through private bills and more recently through the Tucker
Act and the settlement powers of the Comptroller General, the
potentially harsh effects of sovereign immunity have been eased
for those who deal contractually with the federal government.
Certain claims remain, however, for which there may be no effective waiver of immunity. One of these is a claim based upon a
contract that violates procurement law or regulations.

B. Illegal Contracts and the Tucker Act
1. Recovery upon an illegal express contract
When the terms of a contract with the government violate
the central purpose of a procurement statute, courts follow the
general rule of private contract law of no recovery on illegal con-

--

-

-

--

--

--

13. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1976). Similar settlement powers have been granted to all contracting officers under the recently passed Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified a t 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-613 (Supp. 1979)). Section 4 of the Act
provides:
Each executive agency is authorized to settle, compromise, pay, or otherwise
adjust any claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor relating to a contract entered into by it or another agency on its behalf, including a claim or
dispute initiated after award of a contract, based on breach of contract, mistake,
misrepresentation, or other cause for contract modification or recision, but
excluding a claim or dispute for penalties for forfeitures prescribed by statute
or regulation which another agency is specifically authorized to administer,
settle, or determine.
Although the report accompanying the bill is silent on the issue, see generally H.R.REP.
No. 1556, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), this statute may provide another possible remedy
for a contractor who in good faith enters a contract in violation of procurement law. .
14. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1976).
15. 44 Comp. Gen. 353, 358 (1964). See also Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller
General and Government Contracts, 38 GEO.WASH.L. REV.349, 362-66 (1970).
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tracts.16For example, in Acme Process Equipment Co. v. United
States, l7 the government claimed it could cancel a contract for the
production of rifles, even though the contractor had prepared for
production at considerable expense, because the contractor violated the Anti-Kickback Act.18The Court of Claims rejected this
argument, holding that cancellation of contracts was not one of
the sanctions provided in the Anti-Kickback Act.lgThe Supreme
Court reversed, reasoning that a contract should not be enforced
when enforcement would vitiate the central purpose of a statute.20
The Court of Claims denied recovery in the similar case of
City of Los Angeles v. United state^.^' Los Angeles agreed to pay
$75,000 to the Department of the Interior to investigate a dam site
a t Boulder Canyon. The Department agreed to reimburse the city
should Congress ever make funds available for investigation and
construction of Boulder Dam. When Congress did appropriate
funds for that purpose, Los Angeles brought suit in the Court of
Claims seeking reimbursement of the money advanced. The
Court of Claims held that the agreement violated the AntiDeficiency Act, which prohibited obligation of public funds prior
to appropriation. Therefore, no recovery could be allowed.z2
Although there are cases with dicta to the contrary,% the
cases with clear holdings stand for the proposition that no recovery is allowed on a government contract that violates the central
purpose of a statute affecting government procurement^.^^ The
harshness of this rule prohibiting recovery on illegal express contracts is eased in private contract law by such doctrines as quasicontract and estoppel.25These doctrines permit recovery of the
value of the benefit conferred, when justice requires it, even
16. RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS
$ 598 (1932). Comment, Restitutionary Relief Under
L.J. 1143 (1968).
Illegal Contracts in California, 19 HASTINGS
17. 347 F.2d 509 (Ct. C1. 1965), reu'd, 385 U.S. 138 (1966).
18. 347 F.2d at 519.
19. Id. a t 521.
20. 385 U.S. at 145.
21. 68 F. Supp. 974 (Ct. C1. 1946).
22. 68 F. Supp. at 976.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566
n.22 (1961); Crooker v. United States, 240 U S . 74, 81-82 (1916). In both of these cases
recovery was denied on illegal contract grounds; however, each opinion contains language
to the effect that a quantum meruit recovery would be proper if a tangible benefit had
been conferred upon the government.
24. E.g., United States v. Acme Process Equip, Co., 385 U.S. a t 138; Pan Am. Petro.
& Transp. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456,509-10 (1927); City of Los Angeles v. United
States, 68 F. Supp. at 976; Loehler v. United States, 90 Ct. C1. 158, 164 (1940).
25. See, e.g., Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U S . 415 (1880); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 46 F.2d 511 (D. Me. 1931); Hunt v. Turner, 9 Tex. 193 (1853).
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though the party performed pursuant to an illegal contract. The
doctrines, however, are not available to the same extent in government contract law.26
2. Recovery upon an implied contract

The section of the Tucker Act granting jurisdiction to the
Court of Claims states:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.*'

The grant of jurisdiction for implied contracts has been consistently interpreted by the Supreme Court as providing jurisdiction
to hear claims only on contracts implied in fact, not those implied
in law.28The distinction turns on mutual manifestation of assent:
26. Because the Court of Claims has less flexibility in dealing with illegal contracts,
it has been less willing to find procurement contracts illegal. See R. NASH& J. CIBINIC,
FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT
LAW863 (3d ed. 1977).See also John Reiner & Co. v. United States,
325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. C1. 1963) ("court should ordinarily impose the binding stamp of
nullity only when the illegality is plain"). The Court of Claims will decide whether the
illegality is serious enough to justify a finding that the contract is void in ligh; of applicable public policy. When the question of legality is close, the contractor is accorded the
benefit of the doubt in order to allow the reimbursement of good faith expenditures. Id.
at 438. For other cases showing the reluctance of the courts to find government contracts
illegal, see American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. United States, 259 U S . 75,78 (1922); Warren
Bros. Rd. Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 612 (Ct. C1. 1965).
27. 28 U.S.C. $ 1491 (1976).
28. See Alabama v. United States, 282 US. 502 (1931); United States v. Minnesota
Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U S . 212 (1926); Merrit v. United States, 267 U.S. 338 (1925). See also
Jankowitz v. United States, 533 F.2d 538 (Ct. C1. 1976).
The reason for interpreting the words "implied contract" in the Tucker Act as providing jurisdiction only for contracts implied in fact appears to be historical. One commentator writing at the time of the passage of the Tucker Act observed:
The terms "express contract" and "contracts implied in fact" are used then to
indicate, not a distinction in the principles of contract, but a difference in the
character of the evidence by which a simple contract is proved. The source of
the obligation in each case is the intention of the parties.
The phrase "contract implied in law" is used, however, to denote, not the
nature of the evidence by which the claim of the plaintiff is to be established,
but the source of the obligation itself. It is a term used to cover a class of
obligations where the law, though the defendant did not intend to assume an
obligation, imposes an obligation upon him, notwithstanding the absence of
intention on his part, and in many cases in spite of his actual dissent.
Kenner, Quasi Contract, Its Nature and Scope, 7 HARV.L. REV. 57, 59 (1893). Since
implied in law contracts were not considered true contractual obligations, a statute, such
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Contracts implied in fact are based on a manifestation of assent
found in the conduct of the parties although not expressly stated.
In contracts implied in law, or quasi-contracts, there is no manifestation of assent-they are a fiction created by the court to
prevent the unjust enrichment of one of the parties.zY
The distinction between contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law seems simple, but it has become blurred in
a few contexts.30For example, in cases where the government has
illegally received money belonging to an innocent citizen, the
Court of Claims has implied an obligation on the part of the
government to return the money.31This is essentially a restitutionary recovery granted without mention of mutual assent. In
one case involving an alleged oral contract, a district court sitting
admitted the relief it fashioned
under Tucker Act juri~diction~~
might be quasi-contractual in nature.33Despite these apparent
excursions into the realm of contracts implied in law, lower courts
have not fully disregarded the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Tucker Act jurisdi~tion.~'
The federal courts have been particularly reluctant to grant anything resembling quasi-contractual
relief on illegal contracts because the rule prohibiting such recoveries deters contractors from entering illegal bargainseS5
The Court of Claims has, however, permitted recovery on a
contract implied in fact when the express contract is found illegal. New York Mail & Newspaper Transportation Co. u. United
States" has been cited by the Court of Claims as permitting an
implied in fact recovery where the express contract was illegal?'
The contract in New York Mail provided for the rental by the
government of pneumatic tubes for the purpose of mail delivery.
as the Tucker Act, intended to waive immunity for contract claims would not include
implied in law contracts.
29. E.g., J.C. Pittman & Sons v. United States, 317 F.2d 366, 368 (Ct. Ci. 1963).
30. For a discussion of the various contexts in which the Court of Claims apparently
permits quasi-contractual recovery, see Mewett, The Quasi-Contractual Liability of Governments, 13 U. TORONTO
L.J. 56 (1959); Note, Government Contracts: Quasi-Contractual
L.Q. 278 (1957).
Recovery Against the Government, 42 CORNELL
31. E.g., Kirkendall v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 766 (Ct. C1. 1940). See also Royal
Indem. Co. v'. Board of Educ., 137 F. Supp. 890 (M.D.N.C. 1956).
32. The section of the Tucker Act giving district courts jurisdiction to hear contract
claims against the United States is codified a t 28 U.S.C. f~1346 (1976).
33. Halvorson v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Wash. 1954).
34. E.g., Barnett v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 631 (D.S.C. 1975); Collins v. United
States, 532 F.2d 1344 (Ct. C1. 1976).
35. See generally Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921); Elgin Manor, hlc. v.
United States, 279 F.2d 268 (Ct. C1. 1960).
36. 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957).
37. 347 F.2d a t 529.
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After substantial expense had been incurred by the contractor,
the government declared the contract illegal for failure to follow
formal advertising procedures. The court held that because there
was a bona fide purpose to render services to the United States
the parties should be returned to the position they would have
occupied without the attempted contract. It is, however, important to note that the opinion itself never uses the words "implied
in fact contract." Only subsequent interpretation has given the
case this significance.

3. Contract by estoppel
In private contract cases courts will occasionally estop the
parties from denying the validity of a contract if entered into in
good faith and performed by one party.38The government can be
estopped when its agents knowingly mislead the contractor with
conduct or communications upon which the contractor could be
expected to rely.3BEstoppel, however, does not apply to the formation of a contract that violates procurement law. In this situation the contractor is deemed to have constructive knowledge of
procurement law and the limitations that it places on an agent's
authority; formation of a contract beyond that authority cannot
be in good faith. This rationale was articulated by the Supreme
Court in Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill. The plaintiff
in that case, a farmer, received oral assurances that reseeded
wheat was covered by federal insurance, when in reality Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation regulations prohibited coverage of
reseeded wheat. When the farmer suffered the loss of his crop he
brought suit to recover on the policy. The Supreme Court stated:
Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone
entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the
risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act
for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority.
. . And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may
have been unaware of the limitations upon his a~thority.~'

.

When the duty is placed on the contractor to know the limits of
the government agent's authority in a formation situation, the
See, e.g., Daniel v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415 (1880); Hunt v. Turner, 9 Tex. 193
United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970).
332 U.S. 380 (1947).
Id. at 384.
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contractor cannot claim that he entered a contract in excess of
the agent's authority in good faith.

C. Recourse to the Comptroller General
Where the facts are undisputed and the government does not
object, the Comptroller General has used his settlement power to
allow recoveries on illegal contracts.42For example, in one decision the Secretary of War requested an advance ruling on whether
a contractor could be reimbursed for his expenses on a contract
t h a t violated the prohibitions against cost-plus-percentage-ofcost contracts. The Comptroller General recommended that the
contractor be allowed to recover on a quantum meruit basis.43
Regarding the Comptroller General's decisions granting relief on
illegal contracts, one commentator stated: "Whatever the theory,
it appears that the Comptroller General, in the instance of the
illegal contract, grants relief that is not only technically beyond
the power of the courts to give under the Tucker Act, but may
be unavailable as a matter of private law."44
The use of the words "quantum meruit" by the Comptroller
General can be confusing. Often quantum meruit is used as a
measure of damages for implied in fact contracts, meaning simply
the reasonable value of the benefit conferred.45In other decisions, however, the Comptroller General uses quantum meruit as
a synonym for restitutionary recovery. For example, in one decision he held, "If there has been no prior contract, formal, expressed, or implied, the Government is liable on a quantum meruit for the service which has been rendered."46 This ambiguous
usage4' does not raise jurisdictional questions because the Comp-

-

42. The Comptroller General's response to illegal contracts has not been uniform.
Some cases seem to apply the rigid standard of no recovery upon an illegal contract. In
one decision involving a contract in violation of the Walsh-Healey Act, the Comptroller
held: "Not only is an unauthorized contract unenforceable according to its terms, but no
contract may be implied where a statute possibly prohibits the transaction." 33 Comp.
Gen. 63, 65 (1953).
43. 21 Comp. Gen. 800 (1942).
44. Dickson, Restitutionary Concepts and Terminology in Government Contracts
Decisions of the Comptroller General, 6 PUB. CONT.L.J. 1, 30 (1973).
45. Harrington, Howard & Ash, 6 Comp. Gen. 84 (1926); Totty Trunk & Bag Co., 3
Comp. Gen. 100 (1923).
46. 1 Comp. Gen. 323, 325 (1921).
47. In some cases quantum meruit recovery is denied because the mutual assent
necessary for an implied in fact contract is absent. E.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc., 119761 2
COMP.GEN.PROCUREMENT
DEC.(FPI) 769. Other Comptroller General decisions permit a
quantum meruit recovery in the absence of an implied in fact contract where a tangible
benefit is received by the government and the unauthorized action is expressly or imDEC. (FPI) 1
pliedly ratified. See SWF Plywood Co., [I9771 2 COMP.GEN.PROCUREMENT
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troller General's jurisdiction, unlike the Court of Claims', does
not derive from the Tucker Act and its requirement of an express
or implied in fact contract.
OF
11. THEDECISION

THE

COURTOF CLAIMS

Yosernite presented the problem of whether compensation
should be awarded for services performed pursuant to an illegal
express contract. The court found that the contract violated the
statute limiting profit on cost-plus contracts to ten percent and
the regulations prohibiting reimbursement of federal income
taxes as fixed costs.48
The court rejected the argument of YPC that the government
should be estopped from denying the validity of the contract after
YPC had performed for four years. The court correctly pointed
out that the United States is never estopped from denying the
legality of a contract that by its terms violates procurement law
and added, " 'One who purports to contract with the United
States assumes the risk that the official with whom he deals is
clothed with actual authority to enter the contract alleged.' "4y
Despite the conclusions that the express contract was not
enforceable and that four years of performance did not make it
enforceable, the court held that YPC was entitled to a quantum
meruit recovery. The case was remanded to the trial court for a
determination of damages representing the reasonable value of
the benefit received by the government. The trial judge was instructed that YPC's recovery should not exceed the total cost of
YPC's performance plus ten percent.50

The Court of Claims failed in Yosemite to confront the limitations of its jurisdiction and to explain the basis of recovery.
Examination of prior decisions reveals three rationales that the
Court of Claims has used to extend its jurisdiction to contracts
that are defective under federal procurement law. However, when
carefully examined none of these rationales completely explains
the result in this case.
297; Monitor Prods. Co., [I9761 2 COMP.GEN.PROCUREMENT
DEC.(FPI) fi 85; Dictametric
PROCUREMENT
DEC.(FPI) fi 260.
Corp., [I9741 1 COMP.GEN.
48. 582 F.2d at 560-61.
49. Id. at 558 (quoting Haight v. United States, 204 Ct. C1.698, cert. denied, 429 U . S .
841 (1976)).
50. Id. at 561.
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A. Did the Court of Claims Base the Recovery on an Implied in
Fact Contract?
The Court of Clailas has jurisdiction to render judgments on
contracts implied in fact. There are indications in the opinion of
the court that the mutual assent necessary for an implied in fact
contract was present. For example, the court stated: "[Wlhile
it is clear that the Government could no longer be bound by
[the] terms of the Agreement, it is equally clear that the Government bargained for, agreed to pay for, and received the benefit
of YPC's services. . ."51 The court here lays considerable emphasis on the fact that the government bargained for and agreed
to pay for the transportation services. This implies a finding of
mutual assent. The court reasoned further:

.

In determining the amount which plaintiff is entitled to recover,
the Trial Judge is instructed that we do not deem the Government to have assented to payment of more than 10 percent of
the total costs of YPC's performance of the contract nor to reimbursement of the federal income taxes.52

One could infer from the court's language that, even though the
Government could not assent to all the terms of the contract, the
parties had substantially agreed to perform the contract and this
substantial agreement could supply the basis for an implied in
fact contract.
While the parties could have entered an enforceable contract
using the terms suggested by the court, the facts indicate the
parties only assented to a contract that included all the terms.
There was evidence that YPC would not have even entered the
contract if the illegal terms had been excluded." Given this evidence, it can hardly be said that the parties tacitly assented to
the terms recommended by the court.
YPC relied on New York Mail & Newspaper Transportation
Co. v. United States,54the case the Court of Claims cites as permitting implied in fact recovery when the express contract is
illegal.55New York Mail, however, involved a sort of illegal contract that made it a better case than Yosemite for finding an
51. Id. at 560.
52. Id. at 561 (emphasis in original).
53. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment at 63, Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552
(Ct. Cl. 1978).
54. 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957).
55. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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implied in fact contract. The contract in New York Mail was held
invalid for the failure of the parties to conform to procurement
regulations regarding formal advertising. The parties contracted
for a legal purpose; only formation formalities invalidated the
contract. The mutual assent necessary to find an implied in fact
contract was evidenced by a document with legal terms that
could be enforced in their entirety. The contract in Yosemite
evidenced YPC's intent to render services for a compensation that
was illegal; the terms of the contract were illegal, not just the
formation. There is no evidence that the parties intended to enforce less than all of the terms of the contract.
The court in Yosemite does not state that an implied in fact
contract is the basis of their judgment. However, if the suggestions of mutual assent lead to that conclusion, the decision is the
first to hold that contractors can include terms that violate procurement laws and still recover on implied in fact theory.

B. Did the Court Apply the Christian Rationale?
In the past the Court of Claims has been willing to insert into
government contracts the terms necessary to make them conform
to federal procurement law. When the Yosernite court instructed
the trial judge regarding the measure of damages in this case, it
merely substituted the maximum legal percentage for that agreed
to by the parties and disallowed federal income taxes as a reimbursable fixed cost.
The leading case permitting insertion of the terms necessary
to make a government contract legal is G. L. Christian & Associates v. United StatesY The contract in that case did not include
the government's mandatory termination-for-convenience clause.
Because regulations require the clause in all government contracts and because failure to include it would make the contract
invalid, the court assumed that the parties bargained with the
clause in mind.57
The facts in Yosemite can be easily distinguished from those
in Christian. In Christian the contract was silent on the issue of
termination for convenience, hence the court was able to assume
that the parties intended that the standard clause be implied.
The contract in Yosemite was not silent on the issue of compensation but expressly provided for compensation illegal under pro56. 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl.), rehearing denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375

U.S. 954 (1963).
57. 312 F.2d at 424-27.
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curement law. The Christian concept of reformation has not been
extended to contracts where an express term would have to be
changed to make the contract legal? The policy reason for not
permitting a party to an illegal contract to simply exclude any
illegal terms and enforce the remainder is that little incentive
would be left for contractors to exclude illegal terms in their
contracts if, when they do, they can still recover on the next best
legal terms.

C. Did the Court of Claims Recognize Quantum Meruit as an
Exclusive Theory of Recovery?
The court's specific use in Yosemite of quantum meruit without any treatment of whether the basis of recovery was contract
implied in law or in fact creates the impression that quantum
meruit is an alternative form of recovery. This impression is
strengthened when Yosemite is read in light of Narva Harris Construction Corp. v. United States," a decision written by Judge
Kunzig three months prior to his decision in Yosemite. In Narva
Harris ah agent of the United States made oral representation
during the negotiation of an urban renewal construction contract
that the contractor's cost estimates could be adjusted upward at
a later date. When this opportunity was never provided, the contractor brought an action for breach of contract. The government
moved for summary judgment on grounds that the alleged agreement violated a statute requiring written contracts. In denying
the government's motion, the Court of Claims recognized it could
not give implied in law recovery, but stated several times that the
contractor might be entitled to a recovery "on implied-in-fact
contract or quantum meruit."" The use of the disjunctive suggests implied in fact contract and quantum meruit may be alternative theories of recovery.
The idea of quantum meruit as a form of recovery indepen58. The following language from Yosemite may imply that Judge Kunzig allowed the
quantum meruit recovery on the express contract, after severing the illegal price terms:
"The plaintiff is not entitled to enforcement of the provision of the express, written
contract a t issue here since those provisions are invalid as violative of the applicable
procurement law. We also hold, however, that plaintiff is entitled to recover as quantum
meruit the reasonable value of the services. . . ." 582 F.2d at 561. Compare this with the
court's earlier statement that the contract "is rendered invalid as not in accordance with
applicable procurement statutes and regulations." Id. at 553-54.
59. 574 F.2d 508 (Ct. C1. 1978). Cf. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. United States, 580 F.2d
433 (Ct. C1. 1978) (decided the same day as Yosemite; used quantum meruit as measure
of damages for a contract implied in fact).
60. 574 F.2d at 510-11.
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dent from implied contracts is not completely foreign to federal
procurement law. The use of quantum meruit by Judge Kunzig
in both Yosemite and Narva Harris is reminiscent of Comptroller
General decisions
It is not clear whether the use of quantum meruit by the
Court of Claims in Narva Harris and Yosemite is fashioned after
the usage of the Comptroller General or private contract law. In
either instance, the Court of Claims has failed to confront the
limits of its jurisdiction. The Comptroller General derives its authority to grant quantum meruit relief from the settlement powers conferred upon the office by Congress. Neither the Comptroller General nor courts adjudicating private contracts are bound
by the implied in lawlimplied in fact distinction imposed upon
the Court of Claims by the Tucker Act.

D. Evaluation
No clear precedent permits the Court of Claims under the
facts of Yosemite to grant a recovery on any of the theories discussed in this Note, nor is it clear that the court intended by its
decision to expand any of these theories. The court may have
sought what it considered a fair result but left its reasoning intentionally vague to rob the decision of precedential value. On the
other hand, the decision may be an additional venture by the
Court of Claims into the realm of quasi-contract.
The Yosemite decision will most likely invite further attacks
on the rules prohibiting recovery on illegal contracts and limiting
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to express or implied in
fact contracts. Resolution of the issue is the responsibility of the
Supreme Court, where the advantages of giving the Court of
Claims authority to grant restitutionary relieP2 should be balanced against the largely historical reasons for the implied in
lawlimplied in fact distinction and the need for deterring contractors from entering illegal bargains.
The government did not appeal the decision of the Court of
Claims in Yosemite. The government may sense that its position
is vulnerable and that the only way of preserving the rule prohibiting recovery on implied in law contracts is to raise it only in the
best cases.
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

61. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
62. These advantages are considered in Wall & Chilfres, The Law of Restitution and
the Federal Government, 66 Nw. U.L. REV.587 (1971).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Yosemite the Court of Claims did not explain how it
granted relief on an illegal contract within the limitations of the
Tucker Act. The court's prior decisions do not explain the result.
Past decisions involving illegal procurement contracts in which
recovery was based on mutual assent or reformation can be distinguished from Yosemite. The terms of the contract in Yosemite
clearly and directly violated procurement statutes and regulations-there is no precedent for extending New York Mail or
Christian that far. Such an extension, if possible, might be undesirable given the government's interest in discouraging the formation of illegal contracts. Only further litigation can establish
whether, by its decision in Yosemite, the Court of Claims intended to open the door to litigants seeking quasi-contractual
relief on illegal contracts. Since the Supreme Court essentially
created the rule limiting the Court of Claims' jurisdiction, it must
ultimately decide the issue.

Anthony B. Quinn

